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THE ORIGINS OF INEQUALITY, AND  
POLICIES TO CONTAIN IT
Joseph E. Stiglitz
This paper critiques the notion that unfettered inequality is an inevitable conse-
quence of contemporary capitalism, and provides an alternative, new framework for 
analyzing changes in income and wealth distribution. By thinking of these distribu-
tions as the result of changing centrifugal and centripetal economic and political 
forces, we can identify changes in our economic and social structure that may have 
played a central role in the creation of today’s high level of inequality, and we can 
analyze the potential impacts of alternative policies. Specifically, I suggest that 
much of the increase in inequality is associated with the growth in rents — including  
land and exploitation rents (e.g., arising from monopoly power and political  
influence). 
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A host of books in recent years have called attention to the country’s — and the world’s — increasing inequality, attempting to assess its dimensions, causes, con-
sequences, and perhaps most importantly, what can be done about it. These include my 
own book, The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future 
(Stiglitz, 2012) and, most recently, Thomas Piketty’s tome, Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century (2014).1 
Perhaps reflecting the influence of these books, inequality has risen to the top of the 
nation’s agenda. In 2013, President Obama promised to make it the center of focus for 
the remaining three years of his term. (Obama described “a dangerous and growing 
inequality and lack of upward mobility” in a December 2013 speech, one of several 
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 1 Other books on the topic include Galbraith (2012), Milanovic (2010), Noah (2012), Wilkinson and 
Pickett (2010), and Bourguignon (2012). 
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times he has highlighted the issue. “I believe this is the defining challenge of our time: 
Making sure our economy works for every working American.”2) At Davos, business 
leaders have listed inequality as the world’s most pressing problem.3
I. AMERICA’S GROWING INEQUALITY
All of this attention should not come as a surprise. America’s inequality has grown 
enormously over the past 35 years, to the point where the upper 1 percent receives 
more than a fifth of all the nation’s income.4 Wealth inequality is even greater: the 
top 1 percent own about 42 percent of the wealth, and the top 0.1 percent alone own 
22 percent (Saez and Zucman, 2014). And while the share of income garnered by the 
top 1 percent has doubled in the last third of a century, the share going to the top 0.1 
percent has increased even more, going up nearly threefold as of 2013 (Picketty and 
Saez, 2003, with tables updated to 2013). 
The recession made all of this worse. Ordinary Americans were hurt badly by the loss 
of jobs and houses, and according to the Picketty and Saez data, the typical American 
didn’t see any recovery even after the recession officially ended: 91 percent of all the 
increase in the first three years of the “recovery” went to the top 1 percent. An economy 
that is not creating benefits for most of its citizens is a failed economy.5 The impact 
of the recession on wealth inequality was even more devastating, with median wealth 
sinking back to levels from 25 years ago, 40 percent below pre-crisis levels (Boshara, 
Emmons, and Noeth, 2014; Bricker et al., 2014).
Most disturbing were two points that I emphasized in my book: America has the 
highest level of inequality of any of the advanced countries, and America has among 
the lowest levels of equality of opportunity (Stiglitz, 2012).6 As I put it, the American 
Dream is largely a myth. Of course, some very talented individuals do rise from the 
bottom to the top, and this fact is an enormous strength of the country. But the life 
chances of a young American are more dependent on the income and education of his 
or her parents than is the case in other advanced countries — even most of those in old 
Europe. 
What has happened in America has reversed long-standing beliefs about both the 
nature of American society and the evolution of economies. We believed we had become 
 2 “Remarks by the President on Economic Mobility,” December 4, 2013, Washington, DC, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/04/remarks-president-economic-mobility/. Obama has empha-
sized his concern about inequality on several other occasions, including in his January 28, 2014 State of 
the Union address, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-
state-union-address, and in a December 6, 2011 speech at a high school in Osawatomie, Kansas, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/06/remarks-president-economy-osawatomie-kansas.
 3 The World Economic Forum’s January 2015 discussion paper, “Benchmarking Inclusive Growth and 
Development,” http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Inclusive_Growth_Development.pdf, set the tone 
for the meetings this year. 
 4 Piketty and Saez (2003), with data updated through 2013.
 5 Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi (2010) discuss the fact that GDP is not a good measure of economic performance. 
 6 There is much additional literature on the subject, including Jäntti et al. (2006) and Corak (2013).
The Origins of Inequality, and Policies to Contain It 427
a middle class society and the strength of the middle class was the strength of America. 
Not only is the middle class shrinking in size — with more people in poverty — but 
the incomes at the top have pulled away from those in the middle. While the average 
productivity of workers has doubled since 1970, wages for many workers have barely 
increased7 and yet the incomes of the top 1 percent have soared, increasing by 170 
percent, according to Piketty and Saez’s data.
While most serious economists have always been skeptical of notions of trickle down 
economics — that if the top does well, so does the rest of society — what has happened 
in the last third of a century bears testimony to just how wrong that theory is: those in 
the middle have had stagnant incomes for a quarter of a century, and the wage of a full 
time male worker, adjusted for inflation, is lower than it was forty years ago.8
In the middle of the 20th century, Nobel Prize-winning economist Simon Kuznets 
argued that while there is growing inequality in the initial stages of development, 
eventually, inequality is reduced. There is a plausible argument for this pattern: indus-
trial wages exceed agricultural wages, so that with urbanization and industrialization, 
as more and more people go from low-income rural to more highly paid urban jobs, 
standard measures of inequality increase. Eventually, urbanization dominates. With so 
few in the rural sector, their relatively low incomes have little impact on inequality and, 
finally, incomes in the rural sector increase. America seemed to follow this pattern — 
until around 1980. In the years after World War II, the agricultural sector shrank rapidly 
(dropping below 2 percent of employment by the 21st century),9 and America became 
a middle class society. All parts of the society saw their incomes rise, but those at the 
bottom saw their incomes rise faster than those at the top. 
Since 1980, Kuznets’s vision has been destroyed. The growth of the economy as a 
whole was slower than in the decades after World War II, and it was not shared prosper-
ity. This, in part, accounts for the new agenda being put forward by some: rather than 
relying on trickle down economics, this alternative vision says we can and should build 
the economy from the middle, as we did in the period following WWII.
While Piketty takes a much broader view — he is not interested in the separate 
variants of capitalism, such as American style capitalism, but in the underlying 
forces — much of what has happened in the United States has occurred elsewhere. 
The United States may have more inequality, but inequality has been rising in most 
(but not all) countries, especially in the advanced countries (Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, 2011). There is an important implication of 
this: Americans often have an American-centric view, trying to blame or credit one 
 7 Shierholz and Mishel (2013) discuss how real U.S. wages have stagnated for decades. Adjusted for inflation, 
average hourly earnings of production and non-supervisory employees have decreased some 30 percent 
since 1990; see “Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Non-Supervisory Workers,” Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/AHETPI/. 
 8 “Historical Income Table P-36,” U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/
historical/people/.
 9 “Percent of Employment in Agriculture in the United States,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, http://
research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USAPEMANA.
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party or another with the positive and negative changes in our economy. Piketty’s 
book, in effect, warns us against this reasoning, as there appear to be global forces at 
work. 
Piketty’s insight is that the period after World War II — the period in which I grew 
up, and which I didn’t realize at the time was the golden age of capitalism — was 
unusual. He seems to suggest that a high and even growing level of inequality is almost 
an inevitable consequence of capitalism. I say almost because he suggests that there 
are some policies — like a global capital tax — which might arrest it. But most dis-
couraging is the fact that the policy on which he focuses the most seems totally out of 
reach. 
Ever-rising inequality is depressing not only for what it would imply for our society 
and our democracy, but even for our economy. There has been a marked change in 
thinking about the consequences of inequality. It used to be thought that to do anything 
about inequality would require higher taxes that would weaken incentives and thereby 
weaken the economy. Arthur Okun, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under 
President Johnson, referred to this as “the big trade-off” (Okun, 1975). By contrast, the 
major thesis of my book is that we are paying a high price for inequality — at least at 
the extremes it has reached in the United States and in the way that it has been gener-
ated. We could have a stronger economy, higher growth, and less instability if only we 
did something about our outsized inequality. This view has now, in fact, become the 
mainstream view, with support from the IMF (Berg and Ostry, 2011) and others (e.g., 
Galbraith, 2012).
In this essay, I focus on two questions: What has given rise to this inequality? What 
can be done about it? In particular, is rising inequality largely the inevitable consequence 
of market forces (capitalism in the 21st century), about which there is little we can do, 
at least little in the realm of practical politics? 
The major thesis of this essay (and my book) is that our inequality is not, for the 
most part, the result of economic forces. It is not, in this sense, the result of inexorable 
economic laws. Rather, it is the consequence of our policies, and in turn, a reflection 
of our politics. Yes, there are economic forces at play that are dividing the country, 
but even these forces are shaped by — and sometimes driven by — our policies. The 
strongest evidence in support of this perspective is that inequality is so different in 
countries with similar economic structures. The laws of economics operate similarly 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet America’s inequality is greater than elsewhere, and 
those countries that have followed America’s economic model have seen a similar 
(but not quite as great) increase in their inequality. Of course, what happens here has 
effects elsewhere; our policies are contributing not only to inequality here, but also to 
inequalities abroad. Thus, I would argue that the real issue is not capitalism in the 21th 
century, but politics in the 21th century. 
There is a vicious circle in our democracies. Wealth and income inequality translate 
into political inequalities, especially in the United States, where our legal framework 
provides great scope for the influence of money. But then these political inequalities 
translate back into more economic inequalities.
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II. THE CAUSES OF THE INCREASE IN THE WEALTH-INCOME RATIO
A. Piketty’s Narrative
Piketty presents a simple story of growing inequality. If those at the top save all of 
their income, their wealth grows at the rate of return on capital (r), and if r is greater 
than the rate of growth of the economy, wealth grows faster than income as a whole, 
and so too for their income (so long as the rate of return on capital does not diminish 
— which he suggests has not happened and is not likely to happen). He interprets the 
increase in the wealth-income ratio observed in many advanced countries as provid-
ing support for this hypothesis. He also sees the increase in the wealth-income ratio 
as essentially an increase in the capital-income ratio, and thus what economists would 
call capital deepening. 
B. Skepticism About This Narrative
Many economists have been skeptical of this story on several grounds. Piketty’s 
theory focuses on inherited wealth, and yet some (perhaps many) of those at the top 
of the income distribution did not inherit their wealth. The savings rate, s, even at the 
top, is far from 1: best estimates put the number around 0.35 (Carroll, 1998; Dynan, 
Skinner, and Zeldes, 2004; Piketty and Zucman, 2014). If that is the case, then r can 
be considerably greater than g, and yet sr — which would determine the pace at 
which the wealth of the capitalists would accumulate — will be less than g. Many at 
the top seem not to invest their money well, with investment and consumption often 
becoming blurred as their wealth is put into extravagant houses, horses, wineries, 
and art. The upshot is that wealth is often not perpetuated. As I observed in a recent 
paper presented at the 17th World Congress of the International Economic Association 
(Stiglitz, forthcoming), 
John D. Rockefeller was America’s first billionaire. At death, in 1937, his 
assets amounted to 1.5 percent of GDP. Had his assets grown at the rate g (the 
rate of growth of the economy) they would be worth today some $340 billion. 
If r (the relevant rate of return) were just 1 percent more than g, their family 
wealth should have grown to $680 billion. If, using numbers that Piketty might 
say are still conservative, but more realistic, the disparity between g and r is 
2 percent, their wealth would have been $1.3 trillion. Instead, the total value 
of the family assets is estimated to be $10 billion — less than 1 percent of the 
predicted amount — divided among almost 300 members (Roberts, 2014).10
10 It appears from this story that Piketty’s analysis seems to have overestimated “r,” overestimated the extent 
to which returns were reinvested, and underestimated the importance of the division of wealth among one’s 
heirs. 
National Tax Journal430
1. The Rate of Interest is an Endogenous Variable
Most importantly, the rate of interest is an endogenous variable. One of the most 
deep-seated beliefs among economists is the law of diminishing returns. Surely, with 
all of this capital deepening that Piketty suggests has been happening, the rate of return 
on capital should fall. If it doesn’t, we have to rethink our basic models, and in ways 
far more profoundly than those offered by Piketty.
2. The Puzzle of Movements in Factor Returns
There are other disquieting aspects of growing inequality, especially in America, but 
also elsewhere, that are hard to reconcile with standard economic theories. Normally, 
capital deepening would be expected to raise labor productivity, and thereby wages. 
But wages have stagnated. (The numbers are even worse if the wages of the top 1 per-
cent are excluded — the pay of bankers, CEOs, etc. — in which case there has been a 
dramatic decline in the income share of wages (Giovannoni, 2014, 2015).) While some 
have talked a lot about skill-biased technological change (which would increase the 
productivity of some workers at the expense of others), one can show in the standard 
model that average and marginal productivity — and in competitive markets, therefore 
the average wage — should have still increased. 
3. The Puzzle of the Pace of Increase in the Value of Wealth
One thinks of wealth accumulation as a steady process, of setting aside some of one’s 
income every year, not consuming it, but rather investing it. But with America’s low 
savings rate (the average net national savings rate of the United States over the period 
1970–2010 was 5.2 percent),11 one can account for only about half of the increase in 
the value of wealth. 
4. Long-Run Determinants of the Wealth-Income Ratio
Finally, Piketty takes a long-term perspective, and it is therefore natural to ask: what 
determines the wealth-income ratio in the long run? Is it conceivable that the parameters 
describing the economy have changed, say, over the past 40 years, in ways that would 
lead to an increase in the wealth-income ratio, especially of the magnitude observed 
in some countries? Economists have formulated a large number of growth models (all 
within the neoclassical tradition, where output is a function of capital and labor, but 
differing in the determinants of savings). In each model, the equilibrium capital-output 
ratio increases with the savings rate and decreases with the long-run growth rate.12 In 
11 Part, but only part, of the “wealth residual” (the unexplained portion of wealth accumulation) can be 
explained by net capital inflows. 
12 The long-run growth rate in turn is the sum of the long-run rate of increase of the work force plus the rate 
of labor augmenting technological progress. 
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the United States and many other countries, the savings rate has decreased, while the 
growth rate has fluctuated, increasing in the years after World War II, and again in the 
Clinton years, but diminishing more recently. But the movements in the wealth-output 
ratio do not seem to reflect these changes well, either qualitatively or quantitatively. 
C. Capital Is Not to Be Confused with Wealth
There is a simple resolution to these conundrums. Much of the increase in wealth 
has little to do with savings in the usual sense. Rather it is the result of capital gains 
— especially the increased value of land — and an increase in the capitalized value 
of other rents. It is a mistake to confuse capital with wealth. Capital is, of course, an 
aggregation, somehow, of different capital goods. For purposes of assessing control 
over resources, a natural way to aggregate is to use market values. But market prices 
may or may not be a good way of aggregating these factors of production for purposes 
of assessing whether “inputs” into the production process have increased, and quantify-
ing whether they have increased more than the supply of labor (i.e., whether there has 
been capital deepening).13 The value of houses soared in the years before the crisis; 
this is part of our “capital stock.” But no one would say that the capital input into the 
production process increased commensurately. Quite the contrary, the relevant measures 
of plant and equipment may have increased relatively little compared to GDP. In some 
countries, they may even have declined. 
D. The Significance of Land
The distinction between wealth and capital is especially evident once land is taken 
into account. The value of land on the seashore may be going up, but that doesn’t mean, 
in a real sense, the country is “wealthier” (though obviously, the owners of that land 
have more paper wealth). Since land is not increasing, if land is a factor of produc-
tion (which it is, at least when it comes to the production of housing services, which 
constitute a quarter of GDP), then if we are to talk about an aggregate input, we have 
to weigh together the fixed land supply with increasing capital. When we do this using 
the best national income accounting (“aggregation”) techniques, it turns out that the 
aggregate input (“land plus capital”) is actually diminishing relative to GDP, at least 
for some advanced countries. 
Similar to the increase in real estate values is the increase in the value of deplet-
able natural resources, like oil, gas, iron, and copper. Economic theory (Hotelling, 
1931) predicts that the price of these natural resources should increase over time; such 
increases are essential to efficient allocation of these resources over time, and would 
occur even in the absence of their increasing scarcity relative to labor, capital, and 
other inputs. Globally, much of the inequality at the top is related to ownership and 
13 Domestic capital deepening could also occur because of inflows of foreign capital, but such inflows do 
not change the basic picture described here. 
National Tax Journal432
control of such resources, including oil-rich sheikhs in the Middle East and the Russian 
oligarchs. (And, of course, this oil and mineral wealth gets translated in part into real 
estate wealth, as they demand residences in London and New York and homes in the 
Riviera and Southampton.)
The fact that capital in any productive sense is not increasing as fast as wealth helps 
explain part of the anomalies; it could help explain the failure of the return to capital to 
fall, or even the failure of wages to rise as much as one would have expected.
E. Exploitation Rents
But there is, I believe, something else going on: an increase of what might broadly 
be called exploitation rents. With the large inequalities that marked early capitalism 
in the 18th and 19th centuries, two broad strands of thought emerged: one seeking to 
understand the evolving distribution in terms of exploitation and market power, the 
other in terms of social contribution (the marginal productivity theory, what I will refer 
to below as the “neoclassical model,” which is the standard one taught in conventional 
economics courses). There is some truth in both views. In some parts of the economy, 
there is strong competition, with factor prices reflecting productivities, but in others, 
competition is more limited. The incomes of owners in the United States and elsewhere 
was a result of oppression and exploitation, but the exploitation continued long after, 
with discrimination still a part of the American economy. 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, there was much concern about “monopoly 
capitalism.” Rockefeller and Carnegie made their fortunes through monopolies. Today’s 
capitalism is different, and perhaps in some areas even more immune to anti-trust laws. 
Network externalities have given real market power to a few firms and the move to a 
service sector economy may have resulted in greater scope for more local market power. 
Much of the rents are derived by the use of political influence. The railroad barons of 
the Gilded Age made their fortunes in part through land grants from the U.S. government. 
Some of the top fortunes today can be traced either to the exploitation of market power 
or to grants of rents from the government. In many cases, the different forms of rents 
interact. Grants of zoning variances create wealth for real estate moguls; the provision 
of the 2003 law providing coverage for drugs for Medicare recipients that said that the 
U.S. government, the largest purchaser of drugs in the world; could not bargain over 
prices provided an estimated trillion dollars to the drug companies, preferential provi-
sions of the tax laws provide trillions more to other special interests, and the giving 
away of the country’s natural resources (or sales at below competitive prices) provide 
trillions more. The financial sector combines a variety of forms of exploitation rents, 
which have contributed to both the inequalities at the top and the bottom: predatory 
lending and abusive credit card practices provide rents derived from exploiting the poor 
based on imperfect information and knowledge; market manipulation, evidenced in the 
LIBOR and FOREX scandals, also generates rents based on imperfect and asymmetric 
information, but this time, mainly exploiting others who are better off; the huge inter-
change fees associated with credit and debit cards provide rents based on market power 
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related to the control of the payments mechanism. Insider trade and the sophisticated 
front running associated with high frequency trading (Lewis, 2014; Stiglitz, 2014a) 
generate other forms of rent, as does the trading in credit default swaps and derivatives, 
based on non-transparent over the counter trading. As the financial sector has grown to 
account for 8 percent of GDP, garnering for itself 40 percent of all corporate profits in 
the years before the crisis14 — with little to show for its activities in terms of economic 
performance, either in growth or stability — it has become increasingly hard to reconcile 
its returns with the neoclassical model.
F. Evidence in Support of the Exploitation Model
Though there is no way to “prove” which model — the exploitation model or the 
neoclassical model — provides more insights into the origins of our increasing inequality, 
a number of pieces of “evidence” are suggestive. If we look at the Forbes 100 list of the 
wealthiest people, it is striking that it does not include those who have made the most 
important contributions to the advances in our standards of living — the discoverers of 
the transistor or the laser, those whose insights led to the invention of the computer, the 
Internet, or advances in modern medicine, or the discoverers of DNA. They do include 
those who have made important contributions to commerce, but their wealth is often the 
result of amplifying these contributions through the exertion of market power — as in 
the case of Bill Gates. The basic laws of competition limit the wealth that any individual 
can, in a short period of time, accumulate without the exercise of some monopoly power. 
Similarly, if we look across sectors of the economy, it is remarkable in how many rent 
seeking (either based on the exertion of private market power or extraction of rents from 
the public sector through the exercise of public influence) is so evident: agricultural, 
health, natural resources, telecommunications, and high-technology.
The recession provided more evidence. Bank officials, whose contributions to society, 
and even to their firms, were clearly negative, nevertheless received huge bonuses — a 
disconnect between compensation and contributions. But for those who had studied 
executive compensation, this had long been evident. There was no increase in produc-
tivity of managers that could justify the huge increases in their compensation over the 
past 35 years. Moreover, the form of compensation — linked to stock market prices, as 
much determined by changes in interest rates and other factors well beyond the control 
of the executives as by performance — showed that there was not even an attempt to 
closely link contribution and pay. 
Piketty, with his co-authors, provided further evidence. Looking across countries, they 
observed that increasing taxes at the top did not lead to slower growth (Piketty, Saez, 
and Stantcheva, 2014). Under the neoclassical model, one would have expected the 
higher taxes to discourage effort and thus lower growth; under the exploitation model, 
higher taxes might discourage rent seeking, but this could even be good for the economy. 
14 “Table 6.16D. Corporate Profits by Industry,” National Income and Product Accounts, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, http://www.bea.gov/National/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp. 
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Most importantly, though, the exploitation model provides a ready interpretation of the 
seeming anomalies uncovered earlier. When the rights to rents can be bought and sold, 
they get capitalized. Increases in monopoly power show up simultaneously in higher 
profits, lower wages, and a higher value of “capital.” If mining companies get more access 
to valuable natural resources on government-owned land at below-market prices — or 
the gap between what they have to pay and the fair market value increases — then the 
value of these mining companies increases. Changes in bank regulations, which allow 
them to undertake more risk, increase the chances of a bailout and thus the expected 
value of transfers from the government. The value of these transfers will be capitalized 
in the value of the banks, and thus the change in regulations will be reflected in an 
increase in the value of these institutions. One should not misread this as an increase in 
the wealth of the country. In each of these instances, the true wealth of the economy is 
unchanged or diminished. An increase in monopoly power shifts wealth from workers 
to the owners of the firms with market power, but the decrease in the wealth of workers 
is not recorded, while the increase of the value of firms is. Because of the market distor-
tion associated with the exercise of market power, societal welfare is actually lowered. 
Increased transfers of money from the public to the private sector similarly increase the 
wealth of the banks, but decrease the wealth of taxpayers. The former is recorded, the 
latter is not, and because of the distortion, overall wealth is lowered. 
The exploitation theory can thus simultaneously explain the increase in the wealth-
income ratio, the stagnation of wages, and the failure of the return to capital to fall. 
Much of the story of the increase in inequality in the United States is the increase in 
the wealth-income ratio, without a decrease in its return. Simple arithmetic means that 
if that happens, the share of capital in national income increases; since capital is more 
unequally distributed than labor, it follows that such a change would result in an increase 
in the measured inequality of income. These factors explain what might account for 
the increase in the wealth-income ratio and what might simultaneously account for the 
seemingly paradoxical failure of the return to capital to fall. But what gives rise to the 
increase in both land and exploitation rents? I will have a few words to say about this 
later in this essay. 
But this is not the full story, for as noted earlier, there has been an increase in concen-
tration of wealth among capitalists. We also need to better understand the determinants 
of the rate of interest to see why it might not have fallen in the way expected, and why, 
since the middle of the 20th century, there has been an enormous increase in life-cycle 
savings. We need to understand better the relationship between life cycle and inherited 
wealth. It turns out that these three issues are closely related.
III. THE DETERMINATION OF THE RETURN TO CAPITAL
A. The Importance of the Savings Rate of Capitalists
Central in Piketty’s explanation of the growth of the capital- (wealth-) output ratio 
is the observation that the return to capital exceeds the rate of growth. Earlier, I sug-
gested that so long as the savings rate of capitalists is less than unity, what matters is 
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the relationship of sr to g, where s is the fraction of their income that they save. The 
wealth of capitalists increases at the rate of sr, so only if sr is greater than g will inher-
ited wealth increase faster than national income. But sr could plausibly be less than g 
even if r is greater than g. Indeed, that is the case for the numbers provided by Piketty 
and Zucman cited earlier for the United States.15 Moreover, as capital accumulates, one 
would expect r to decline. Economic theory ought to explain whether, in the long run, 
sr could plausibly remain above g.
In fact, standard growth theory provided an answer to these questions a half century 
ago. I used such theories to develop a theory of the distribution of income and wealth 
among individuals in my Ph.D. thesis.16 In the long run, if all individuals save the same 
fraction of their income (as in the classic Solow (1956) model that defined neoclassical 
growth theory), then in the long run, sr < g.17 With s being around a third, all that is 
required is that the rate of return to capital be less than three times the rate of growth; 
most studies suggest that this is the case now and the general theory argues that this 
will be true over the long run.
I showed that under this condition, if all families had the same wage, divided their 
income equally among their children, and had the same number of children, then wealth 
would eventually be fully equalized, regardless of the initial distribution of income. I 
had shown that what mattered was not the relationship between r and g, but between sr 
and g, and in the long run, inequalities would not persist because sr would be less than 
g (even though r would be greater than g) in these simple models. There are, however, 
other forces giving rise to inequalities, which I discuss in the next section.
B. The Implications of Differences in Savings between Capitalists and Workers
First, I note that there are other frameworks generating somewhat different results. In 
the battles in the middle of the 20th century over different views of growth, the Cambridge 
School (United Kingdom) argued that a better model than the Solow neoclassical model 
hypothesized that capitalists save a far larger fraction of their income than workers. In 
the long-run equilibrium, sc r = g, where sc is the savings rate of capitalists. The rate of 
interest in long-run equilibrium was greater than the rate of growth, by just enough to 
offset the fact that capitalists save less than all of their income. In the long run, contrary 
to Piketty, the wealth of capitalists grows at exactly the same rate as the economy.
As I showed in Stiglitz (1969b), this has, however, a disturbing implication: any 
initial inequalities in wealth ownership (among the capitalists) are preserved. There 
is neither a tendency for wealth inequalities to increase or decrease. But if there is 
variability in the returns to capital, then inequalities in wealth grow increasingly large 
15 With the savings rate at the top of the income distibution around 1/3, and g around 2.8 percent, sr < g so 
long as r < 8.4 percent, which it clearly is on average. 
16 This work was presented in 1966 to the meetings of the Econometric Society in San Francisco, and sub-
sequently published (in abbreviated form) as Stiglitz (1969b).
17 Solow showed that sY/K = g, where Y/K is the output capital ratio. But Y = wL + rK, where w is the wage 
rate, so it is immediate that g = sr + (swL/K) > sr. 
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over time. The fact, however, that those at the very top of the wealth distribution in the 
United States are not those who have had wealth accumulate over multiple generations 
suggests that this is not a good model for understanding the distribution of wealth, at 
least in the United States.
C. Life-Cycle Savings and Taxes
Late 20th century capitalism in the United States and many other advanced countries 
was accompanied by an enormous increase in life cycle savings, as life expectancies 
grew far faster than retirement ages. The increase in (private) retirement savings was 
somewhat dampened by the growth of public retirement programs, but increased with 
the shift from defined benefit programs to defined contribution systems.18 One might 
have thought that these large amounts of retirement savings would have driven down 
the return to capital — perhaps even making sc r < g, just as in the neoclassical model 
— leading towards the equalization of wealth. And that may have happened in the 
middle of the 20th century. 
But two forces worked in the other direction. First, and perhaps most importantly, 
changes in tax laws meant that the very rich actually faced lower tax rates than the 
not-so-rich, so that for them, s times their after-tax returns was greater than the rate of 
growth. (We will return later to a more extensive discussion of taxation.)
Secondly, in the long run, there is a balance between dissaving of the retired and 
the saving of the young. In the long-run equilibrium, it turns out that even with life 
cycle savings, sc r = g. The capital stock, rates of return to capital, and wage rates are 
all determined by the savings behavior of capitalists. Life cycle savings “crowds” out 
capitalists savings. The greater the life cycle savings, obviously the smaller the share 
of the country’s wealth that is owned by the plutocrats — but that is the only effect.19
IV. CENTRIFUGAL AND CENTRIPETAL FORCES
The best way of thinking about the changing distribution of income and wealth is to 
think of the economy being pulled apart by centrifugal forces — creating more inequal-
ity — at the same time that there are underlying centripetal economic forces dampening 
inequality. The equilibrium distribution of income and wealth reflects a balancing of 
these centrifugal and centripetal forces. Over time, the strength of, say, the centrifugal 
forces may increase, and this will lead to an increase in inequality. Such an “equilibrium” 
theory provides a better approach to thinking about what has been going on in recent 
decades than the notion that there are certain inexorable forces in capitalism leading to 
18 The shift from defined benefit to defined contribution systems would not have resulted in a change in 
wealth but a change in who controlled it, if the former had been fully funded. In defined benefit programs, 
the wealth would have resided within corporations. It would be a difficult task to attribute this wealth to 
the eventual recipients. 
19 This result is developed in Stiglitz (forthcoming) but was anticipated in Pasinetti (1962).
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ever-increasing inequality. Rather, changes in economics and in policies have changed 
the balance between the two sets of forces. By identifying what these forces are, one 
is in a better position to “rebalance” the economy.
The fact that wealth compounds at the rate of interest obviously is an important 
centrifugal force, but the fact that only a fraction of wealth is reinvested and that sr < 
g in the basic neoclassical model means that wealth compounds at a rate slower than 
the growth of the economy; limitations on savings thus act as a centripetal force. The 
variability of returns to capital also leads to wealth and income inequality. Those who 
are lucky will give more wealth to their children, and if their children are also “lucky” 
they will be able to bequeath more to their children. In 1953, a brilliant colleague at 
Cambridge (United Kingdom), David Champernowne, formulated a simple stochastic 
model generating income and wealth distributions with fat-tails (more wealth in the 
extremes of the distribution than one would have expected with, say, a lognormal dis-
tribution) (Champernowne, 1953). In Stiglitz (1969b),20 I then showed that a stochastic 
variant of my neoclassical model satisfied the Champernowne conditions. Subsequently, 
in Bevan and Stiglitz (1979) (see also Bevan, 1979), I used more advanced techniques 
(employing diffusion models) to demonstrate that the level of inequality decreased with 
the size of g – sr and increased with the variability of returns. But, as I noted earlier, 
r itself is an endogenous variable, affected, for instance, by the savings rate itself. 
More recently, in Stiglitz (forthcoming), I show that the level of wealth inequality 
increases with the share of capital. The observed increase in the share of capital would 
thus be expected to lead to more inequality among wealth-holders; if the elasticity of 
substitution is less than one,21 an increase in the capital-labor ratio (e.g., as a result of 
an increase in the savings rate or a reduction in the population growth rate) will lead 
to a decreased share of capital and less inequality. Of course, just the opposite hap-
pens if, in spite of the increase in the wealth-income ratio, the capital-effective-labor 
ratio declines. Either way, it reinforces my earlier conclusion: one cannot understand 
what is happening to inequality of wealth without taking into account the growth of 
rents.
Wage dispersions — especially in the extremes — give rise to wealth inequality. Those 
at the bottom accumulate no wealth, while those at the very top save enough not only 
for their retirement, but to pass on wealth to their heirs. If the wages of children were 
the same as those of the parents, wealth inequality would simply reflect these underly-
ing wage disparities (compounded by the good and bad luck of the random returns on 
capital). But there is a process of regression towards the mean, and a faster pace of 
regression will result in less wage and wealth inequality. The aphorism “rags to riches 
and back to rags in three generations” reflects this perspective. 
20 This is the unpublished version of Stiglitz (1969b), which I presented at the December 1966 meetings of 
the Econometric Society in San Francisco.
21 The elasticity of substitution describes how easy it is to substitute capital for labor. When the elasticity is 
low, an increase in capital (relative to labor) so diminishes the return to capital that the overall share of 
capital diminishes.
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The fact that the rich save so much more than the poor is a centrifugal force, as those 
who get large incomes (as a result of high wages or a high return on investments) will 
save more to pass on their wealth to their children. If the savings function (giving sav-
ings as a function of income or wealth) is S-shaped, then it is possible that the two-class 
model described earlier (a capitalist class whose income is largely based on wealth 
that saves at a high rate, and a working class with more limited savings, mostly for 
retirement) provides a good description of the economy. The inequality of wealth is not 
caused by the differences in savings functions — all individuals could have the same 
savings function — but the differences in savings rate simply reflect the endogenous 
distribution of income and wealth. 
Dispersions in family size and in inheritance customs and law can also affect inheri-
tances and wealth inequality. Primogeniture gives rise to high levels of inequality. If 
there is a high variability in family size, then, even with equal division, there will be a 
large dispersion in inheritances. 
This framework allows us to think about how changes in the economy, society, 
and policies may have affected the centripetal and centrifugal forces. With the very 
rich paying a smaller tax rate on capital than the less wealthy, the centrifugal force of 
wealth-compounding has increased. In the standard neoclassical model, capital taxation 
reduces the variability of returns and hence tail-inequality. Thus a reduction in the aver-
age taxation of capital (even without the regressivity currently observed) leads to more 
inequality (unless offset by a corresponding fall in the before-tax return — see below).
There are many ways in which rich parents can transmit advantages to their children, 
including by providing them with a better education. Public education can thus be an 
important equalizing force. But if there is economic segregation (and there is evidence 
of an increase in such segregation), if schools are locally funded, and if schools in rich 
communities provide a better education than those in poor communities, then there will 
be more intergenerational transmission of advantages. The equalizing force of “regres-
sion towards the mean” will be dampened, as it will if there is more assortive mating, 
as a result of the rich and talented being more segregated into schools that are different 
from those attended by others. 
The fact that advantages are transmitted across generations implies, of course, that 
societies, such as the United States, with high levels of economic inequality are likely 
to be marked by low levels of economic opportunity, a relationship that Krueger (2012) 
has labeled the Great Gatsby curve,22 which has also been shown to hold within the 
United States (Chetty et al., forthcoming). This is especially the case in the absence of 
government actions to “level the playing field,” by providing all children, regardless 
of the income of their parents, access to good education and health care. Programs 
like Head Start are designed to partially undo some of the disadvantages facing the 
poor, and there is some evidence that such programs work (Heckman, 2011; Heckman, 
Pinto, and Savelyev, 2013). By the same token, the increase in inequality in the United 
22 Krueger’s remarks were based on the work of Corak (2013). 
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States in recent years suggests that going forward there will be still greater inequalities 
of opportunity, which will then translate into still greater inequalities in income and 
wealth.
V. EXPLAINING THE INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF LAND
Earlier, I argued that the basic neoclassical model could only explain part of the 
increase in income and wealth inequality. Much of the growth in inequality and the 
increase in the wealth-income ratio are related to an increase in rents and land values. 
In the middle of the last century, land was essentially dropped out of the models used 
by economists. After all, agriculture, the source of the major demand for land, had 
shrunk to a very small fraction of GDP. But as I noted earlier, housing services is an 
important component of GDP, and land values, especially in our urban areas, are an 
important part of housing services. Indeed, with urbanization, one would expect an 
increase in land values. 
But there is more going on: land is a store of value. The value of land today is largely 
dependent on its expected value tomorrow, ad infinitum. This means that land prices are 
largely untethered. Rising expectations can, at least for a while, be self-fulfilling. Land 
bubbles have marked capitalism from its early days, and we have been going through 
just the latest instance.23 But even when there is a “correction,” there is no assurance 
that the economy is not off on another bubble-path. 
One of the main drivers of land prices (or the value of other non-produced assets) is 
credit availability. As quantitative easing made so abundantly clear, a flood of liquidity 
can drive up asset prices. This is especially easy because, as I noted, land prices are 
largely untethered. If credit is made available to those with collateral and provided at 
interest rates below the expected rate of return, there will be a heavy demand for those 
assets (like land) that can easily be used as collateral. Thus, changes in monetary and 
regulatory policies that lead to an expansion of credit will contribute to an increase in 
the value of land — to an increase in “wealth” — but not necessarily to an increase in 
the country’s real capital stock.
Such monetary policies can contribute at the same time to growth in income and 
wealth inequality, and the mechanism by which this occurs represents a fundamental 
change in our understanding of the structure of the economy. In the 19th century, analyses 
of monetary policy focused on impacts on creditors and debtors. The election of 1896 
was fought on this issue: moving to the bimetallic standard would lead to higher prices, 
reducing the value of the debts owed by farmers to the banks. Thus, loose monetary 
policy was seen as pro-equality. 
23 Technically, they could be prevented if there were markets for land going out infinitely far into the future. 
The equilibrium conditions requiring the returns to land (rents plus capital gains) to equal the returns to 
capital goods imply that if the price is not “right,” bubble prices can’t be sustained, as demonstrated in the 
last episode. Formal models showing this have been developed by Stiglitz (forthcoming), Hahn (1966), 
and Shell and Stiglitz (1967). 
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Similarly, in the post World War II era, looser monetary policies were associated 
with faster economic growth and higher employment, driving up wages. The exces-
sive focus on inflation contributed to a ratcheting down of wages; when a recession 
occurred, wages stagnated, and workers did poorly. But as soon as the economy started 
to recover and unemployment fell, central banks, focusing on inflation, would raise inter-
est rates, preventing workers from recovering in the upswing what they had lost in the 
recession. 
Keeping interest rates close to zero seems to have contributed to wealth inequality, 
too. While this policy didn’t stimulate the economy much (as predicted — though it 
may have prevented the economy from falling into an even deeper downturn), it hurt 
owners of short-term government bonds — older, risk-averse people who had acted 
conservatively — but helped the owners of equity, disproportionately the very rich. 
Earlier, I talked about two types of wealth holdings: life cycle and inherited. While the 
proportion of wealth in life cycle savings may be far higher than seventy-five years 
ago, there are important compositional differences in the two kinds of wealth holding. 
The very rich are able to bear more risk, and disproportionately own equities, so the 
low interest policy of the Federal Reserve, which advantaged equities, improved the 
fortunes of those at the top.
VI. EXPLAINING THE INCREASE IN EXPLOITATION RENTS
There are several reasons for the increase in exploitation rents, some of which were 
noted earlier in this essay, including that changes in technology gave more scope for 
network externalities, and thus for market power. But there are other institutional and 
societal forces at play. Changes in mores led corporate executives to exploit weaknesses 
in corporate governance laws, and the weakening of unions meant that they were less 
able to check these abuses. An unintended consequence of the 1993 tax change — effec-
tively imposing taxes on high executive pay unless it was performance related — was 
to encourage seemingly performance-related executive pay. Executives discovered new 
non-transparent ways of increasing their incomes, including by diluting shareholder 
holdings. Accounting rules gave them ample scope for doing so. Globalization — in 
the asymmetric way that it was done, without appropriate safeguards — and declining 
unionization weakened the bargaining power of workers. Deregulation of financial 
institutions allowed them to engage in more exploitive activities. 
There were some opposing changes, but these proved less powerful than had been 
expected. Laws against discrimination and affirmative action programs did allow a larger 
number of minorities and women to be more successful; yet the average black-white 
gap in incomes remains unchanged, that in wealth has increased, especially after the 
recession, and the gender gap remains large. 
Finally, there is little doubt that there has been an increase in the influence of money 
in politics. And because the size of government itself has increased, there are more 
opportunities and incentives for the wealthy and corporate interests to engage in rent 
seeking in the public sphere. The deregulation movement itself, especially in the financial 
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sector, can be viewed as part of this rent-seeking agenda. President Eisenhower, in his 
farewell address, effectively warned against such rent seeking on the part of the military-
industrial complex. But the list of successful rent seekers today is much larger, including 
the drug companies as well as those in oil, gas, and mining, and the financial sector. 
Public policy has affected inequality in other ways. In some periods, there has been 
lax enforcement of antitrust laws, and even the limited rules governing, say, the finan-
cial sector. Lowering taxes on the wealthy may have actually encouraged rent seeking. 
It takes effort (and in some cases, rather unpleasant effort) to engage in rent seeking. 
Since so much of the return to rent seeking goes to those at the very top of the income 
distribution, when their tax rates are lowered, the benefits of rent seeking, relative to 
the costs (especially the personal costs) may be lowered. 
VII. TAXATION AND OTHER PUBLIC POLICIES
The previous section outlined some of the ways that public policy in recent years has 
contributed to the increase in inequality. In fact, every law and regulation and every 
policy potentially has an impact on inequality. Markets don’t exist in a vacuum, and 
our laws and regulations determine how they operate. A bankruptcy law, such as ours, 
that gives owners of derivatives first claim helps derivatives; a bankruptcy law, such as 
ours, that makes student loans almost undischargeable even in bankruptcy, discourages 
borrowing for education and thus impairs upward mobility on the part of those who 
need loans to obtain a good college education. 
So too for every expenditure program. Australia provides income contingent loans 
to every university student. Other countries provide large subsidies that lead to lower 
tuition. With a university education increasingly necessary for economic success, a 
tuition-financed system such as ours makes a university education less accessible in the 
United States than in other countries, reduces upward mobility, and thereby contributes 
to inequality.
Taxes in particular can have a large effect on inequality, as I noted earlier, but as 
always, one has to pay particular attention to tax-shifting. Consider, for instance, Pik-
etty’s central model in which capital accumulation is the result of capitalists saving a 
fraction (all) of their wealth. If in this world a tax is imposed on capital, the amount 
of savings/investment will be reduced, and the return to capital will increase. In the 
short run, Piketty is right that there will be a reduction in the capital-output ratio and a 
reduction in the extent of inequality among capitalists. But the lower level of investment 
will lead to a higher return to capital, and in the long run, the after-tax return will be 
exactly the same as before. There is no change in income and wealth inequality among 
capitalists. Moreover, because the capital stock is lower, wages will be lower. It can 
be shown (Stiglitz, forthcoming) that even if all the tax proceeds are redistributed to 
workers, they can be worse off. Quite different results are obtained if the tax is imposed 
on inheritances (and even better, if one taxes the returns to capital that are not part of 
life cycle savings), or if the government invests the tax proceeds, in which case, it may 
even be possible that there will not be a decline in wages. 
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But full shifting only occurs in this special model, and only if the government does 
not invest some of the proceeds. If it does so, particularly in investments that increase 
workers’ productivity (either investments in human capital or in technology or infra-
structure that are complementary with labor), then wages can rise and the standard of 
living of workers can improve.
My analysis has shown that tax structures that tax inheritances and exempt life cycle 
savings from interest income taxes can also improve the distribution of income and 
wealth.24 The earlier discussion emphasized, too, the importance of progressive capital 
taxes, and how our current tax structure, which is regressive at the top, may itself be 
contributing to the growth of wealth inequality at the top. 
Some have argued against the taxation of capital (and inheritances) on the grounds 
that such taxes are inefficient. The returns to capital consist of four parts: (1) the pure 
rate of interest — the T-bill rate; (2) the return to risk — related to the β of the asset; 
(3) the excess returns from the ability of the investment manager (presumably, what he 
is compensated for, and typically referred to as the α); and (4) rents — some of these 
excess returns may be related to the exercise of monopoly power or other aspects of 
rent seeking.
In this parsing, at most, it is the first that should not be taxed on the standard effi-
ciency grounds that differential taxation distorts the economy, and in recent years, 
these returns have been very, very low. Increases in taxation of the second component 
(so long as there are adequate provisions for loss offsets) actually increase efficiency; 
well-designed higher taxation provides better risk sharing, which is especially important 
in the context of imperfect risk markets (Domar and Musgrave, 1944; Stiglitz, 1969a). 
The third component should be included in labor income, and subject to the progressive 
income tax. If some individuals consistently get higher risk-adjusted returns to capital, 
those higher returns should be ascribed to their “labor services.” Indeed, those in Wall 
Street always claim that is why they should be well compensated. (The preferential 
tax treatment of carried interest is one of the ways that our tax system leads to more 
inequality.) The fourth component should be taxed at very high rates. 
There is a practical challenge in parsing out the components, but, at the very least, 
this parsing of the nature of the returns to capital should make it clear that the returns 
to capital should be taxed, and possibly at rates even higher than those imposed on 
conventionally measured labor income. If one cannot parse out the different compo-
nents, then the tax rate imposed should reflect the relative importance of the different 
components even if one were not concerned with redistribution. 
Finally, I want to link this discussion with the earlier analysis of increases in wealth 
inequality, which showed that the increases are closely related to increases in land prices. 
Piketty’s recent book noted the enormous increases in the wealth-output ratio in most 
capitalist countries in the last third of a century. But these increases have been partly, 
24 Even in this case, however, one has to be attentive to tax shifting, as such taxes might encourage a shift 
toward the transfer of human capital. But provided there is a good public education system, the effects of 
this shift will be limited. 
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and in some cases largely, related to increases in the value of land. A tax on the return 
to land, and even more so, on the capital gains from land, would reduce inequality and, 
by encouraging more investment into real capital, actually enhance growth. This is, of 
course, an old idea, promoted most famously by Henry George (1879).
In concluding this section, let me digress briefly. The standard argument against 
differential taxation is based on Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976),25 in which we showed 
that if there is an optimal income tax, then no differential taxation on commodities is 
desirable. An implication is that, treating consumption at different dates as different 
commodities, one should not impose an interest income tax, which changes the relative 
price of consumption at different dates. That model entailed special technical assump-
tions (e.g., about the separability between consumption of all goods and leisure) that 
limit its applicability. Beyond that, several factors are omitted from this model.
First, there are no inheritances. If there were, and they were observable, then they 
would normally be taxed. How they should be taxed within the standard social welfare 
framework is a more complicated matter.
Second, there are no rents. As explained above, much of the seeming return to capital 
is actually rents, and the Henry George principle says that such rents should be taxed 
at 100 percent. 
Third, in the Atkinson-Stiglitz framework, individuals differ in only one respect 
— their output per hour. But skill mixes are far more heterogeneous, and tax policy 
(encouraging, say, some kinds of investments and discouraging others) can affect the 
before-tax distribution of income just as it can affect the after-tax distribution of income. 
It is, in fact, desirable for government not to just rely on ex post redistribution, 
but to design tax and expenditure policies, to the extent possible, that create a more 
equalitarian pre-tax and transfer distribution of income, reducing the burden imposed 
by redistributive taxation.26
VIII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Piketty’s book provides us with a wealth of data to interpret. It had been widely rec-
ognized that inequality in most advanced countries had been increasing markedly since 
1980. It had also been widely recognized that inequality was lower in the period after 
World War II than it had been, say, in America’s Gilded Age or in the years just before 
the Great Depression. The juxtaposition of those two observations leads to a natural 
question: Was this period that I referred to earlier as the golden age of capitalism a rare 
exception, the result of the unusual solidarity brought about by World War II, includ-
ing policies like the GI bill that provided a free college education to everyone who had 
fought (which was essentially every young able-bodied man)? Or did the policies that 
began to be instituted in the 1980s represent an aberration of the trend that Kuznets 
had earlier identified — of economic advances being associated with greater equality? 
25 The result was subsequently generalized in Kaplow (2006).
26 Stiglitz (1998, 2014b) provides a more extensive discussion of the issues.
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The general theories that I have discussed in this review, while they cannot provide 
a definitive answer, provide some hints. In the absence of changes in policies, such as 
lowering taxes on capital, standard models would not imply either the increase in the 
wealth-income ratio or the increase in inequality that has been observed. The standard 
economic model will not suffice. 
One set of changes that I have not discussed are changes in technology. Technological 
change has made labor more productive, and at least in some areas, like computing, 
there have been enormous increases in the productivity of capital. Some types of labor 
have had their productivity increased more than others.27 Still, there should have been 
an increase in average wages paid (given that the rate of return to capital has remained 
roughly constant).28 And these changes in technology cannot explain why there should 
have been such an increase in the gap between average wages (or compensation) and 
productivity.
This leaves two other partially related sets of explanations: (1) an increase in rents29 
— an increase in land rents and land values, and an increase in exploitation rents and 
an associated increase in wealth that represents the capitalization of those rents; and (2) 
changes in public policies which are, on balance, inequality-increasing. I have shown 
how a variety of policies — most importantly, tax, education, antitrust, monetary, cor-
porate governance, and regulatory policies — may have contributed to recent increases 
in inequality.
Americans still like to see themselves as the middle class families of the 1950s. That 
period, as Piketty has reminded us, was unusual, and much has happened in the last 
half century. The set of policy and structural changes brought on in the 1980s, here and 
abroad — deregulation, globalization, the lowering of marginal tax rates — did not 
bring about the burst of growth that had been hoped for in the United States and other 
advanced countries. Growth, in fact, has been markedly slower than in the decades after 
World War II, and the benefits of what growth there has been have gone to those at the 
top of the income distribution. 
The title of Piketty’s book and much of his analysis suggests that it is capitalism that 
is at fault, that this is just the way that market economies work. My analysis of market 
27 Although such skill-biased technological change may have played an important role in explaining wage 
inequalities before 2000, it is hard to see how they can account for what has happened since. It is also 
hard to reconcile the timing of changes in wage rates with changes either in technology or globalization. 
Shierholz, Mishel, and Schmitt (2013) provide a more extensive critique and review of the literature. 
28 This is proven in Stiglitz (forthcoming).
29 There is one further category of rents that has increased — those associated with intellectual property. 
While important, they do not seem to be the primary drivers of the observed increases in inequality. Part of 
the increase in intellectual property rents is associated with the move to a knowledge economy, but part of 
the increase is the result of stronger intellectual property laws. While there is a debate about whether this 
has led to more innovation (there are reasons to believe it may have had exactly the opposite effect), it is 
clear that the “enclosure of the knowledge commons” (to use Boyle’s term) has generated more measured 
wealth, appropriating benefits that would have otherwise been shared in society (Boyle, 2003; Stiglitz, 
2014c).
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models suggests that there is no inherent reason that there should be the high level of 
inequality that is observed in the United States and many other advanced countries. It 
is not a necessary feature of the market economy. It is politics in the 21st century, not 
capitalism, which is at fault. Market and political forces have, of course, always been 
interwined. Especially in America, where our politics is so money-driven, economic 
inequalities translate into political inequality. 
There is nevertheless considerable hope. For if the growth of inequality was largely 
the result of inexorable economic laws, public policy could do little more than lean 
against the wind. But if the growth of inequality is the result of public policy, a change 
in those policies could lead to an economy with less inequality, and even stronger 
growth.
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